I am a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of Chicago. I study International Relations focusing on International Political Economy (IPE). My primary research interest is bureaucratic politics in global economic governance.
I examine career bureaucrats who work at foreign affairs agencies and international economic organizations. They are neither elected nor appointed, yet they implement policies and mediate negotiations. In my dissertation “Bureaucratic Behavior in the Political Economy of Trade,” I answer the following two questions: (1) how the career-mindedness of bureaucrats affects their responsiveness to principals; (2) and how the implementation of policies by bureaucrats, in turn, affects elections. My research is supported by the Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State, the Center for International Social Science Research, and the Korea Foundation for Advanced Studies, among others.
I use game theory and quantitative empirical methods. In Winter 2020, I taught undergraduate Formal Theory II (Game Theory I) as a graduate student lecturer. My detailed CV is available at here.